

**INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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**COUNTRY** Cuba  
**SUBJECT** Political Attitudes and Affiliations in the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI)  
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**FIELD REPORT NO.**

**THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.**

**SOURCE:** A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

1. Although there are many members of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI) who appear interested in and favorable toward the Communist Party, Source knows of only three persons who are actually members: Saul GONZALEZ, alias "Denis"; Manuel VEGA Perez, alias "Marcos Viera"; and Felix SUAREZ, alias "Federico Santiesteban". SUAREZ was a sort of political adviser in the DGI operations departments, but insisted he was not a commissar, but, rather, a person in charge. Although Source and the other officers would tease SUAREZ by calling him "Comisario", SUAREZ greatly resented the term and actually physically attacked Source for doing so. Every Saturday morning at 8:30, SUAREZ held a political indoctrination meeting which all personnel were supposed to attend. Source was habitually late to these sessions, and although he was given penalties for his obvious disaffection, he never paid any attention to them. The DGI personnel Source knew were perfectly willing to talk politics among themselves but in a rather desultory way; the discussions never went on very long.
2. Apparently during 1962, there had been considerable sentiment for Anibal ESCALANTE and his faction, the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), but in 1964 the PSP group was disrupted and the real loyalty was to Fidel CASTRO rather than to the Party.

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WEC/NO	WE/VADR	1	CI/R&A	3	IE/BRITISH		NP (AMMUG-1)
WEC/RE					I/WASH/BE		CSCI-316/02294
WEC/OS			RID/AN	1			
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TOTALS WEC 8 (1), WE 1 (1), CI 4, RID 1						LIAISON	COORDINATING RELEASE

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**- 2 -**

**CSCI-316/02294-65**

ESCALANTE, while he remained in Cuba, was apparently the liaison officer between the DGI and the PSP. When ESCALANTE left Cuba, the liaison between the DGI and the PSP was taken over by Ramiro VALDES, as a CP member, and he was described as a true representative. The DGI operated strictly on orders from the Party, conveyed through VALDES.

3. Membership in the Partido Unido Revolucionaria Socialista (PURS) made life easier and entry into the DGI more simple. Between August 1963 and April 1964, all new personnel hired by the DGI came from the Union de Jovenes Comunistas (Union of Young Communists - UJC), which was PURS-oriented.

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